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Abstract
The gravity equation in international trade is one of the most robust empirical finding
in economics: bilateral trade between two countries is proportional to their respective sizes,
measured by their GDP, and inversely proportional to the geographic distance between them.
While the role of economic size is well understood, the role played by distance remains a mys-
tery. In this paper, I propose the first explanation for the gravity equation in international
trade. This explanation is based on the emergence of a stable international network of im-
porters and exporters. Firms can only export into markets in which they have a contact. They
acquire contacts by gradually meeting the contacts of their contacts. I show that if, as observed
empirically, (i) the distribution of the number of foreign countries accessed by exporters is fat
tailed, (ii) there is a large turnover in exports, with firms often going in and out of individ-
ual foreign markets, and (iii) geographic distance hinders the initial acquisition of contacts
in an arbitrary way, then trade is proportional to country size, and inversely proportional to
distance. Data on firm level, sectoral, and aggregate trade support further predictions of the
model.
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Introduction
Fifty years ago, Jan Tinbergen (1962) used an analogy with Newton’s universal law of gravitation
to describe the patterns of bilateral aggregate trade flows between two countries A and B as
“proportional to the gross national products of those countries and inversely proportional to the
distance between them,”
TA,B ∝ (GDPA)
α (GDPB)
β
(DistAB)
ζ
with α,β, ζ ≈ 1. The so called “gravity equation” in international trade has proven surprisingly
stable over time and across different samples of countries and methodologies. It stands among the
most stable and robust empirical regularities in economics.
While the role of economic size (α,β ≈ 1) is well understood in a variety of theoretical settings,
to this day no explanation for the role of distance (ζ ≈ 1) has been found. This paper offers such
an explanation for the first time.
The empirical evidence for the gravity equation in international trade is strong. Both the
role of distance and economic size are remarkably stable over time, across different countries,
and using various econometric methods. Disdier and Head (2008) use a meta-analysis of 1,467
estimates of the distance coefficient ζ in gravity type equations in 103 papers. There is some
amount of dispersion in the estimated distance coefficient, with a weighted mean effect of 1.07
(the unweighted mean is 0.9), and 90% of the estimates lying between 0.28 and 1.55. Despite this
dispersion, the distance coefficient ζ has been remarkably stable, hovering around 1 over more
than a century of data. If anything, Disdier and Head (2008) find a slight increase in the distance
coefficient since 1950. The size coefficients α and β are also stable and close to 1. Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003) show how to estimate gravity equations in a manner that is consistent with
a simple Armington model, and how to deal especially with differences in country sizes.1 Silva
Santos and Tenreyro (2006), Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) and Eaton, Kortum and
Sotelo (2011) show how to accommodate zeros in the matrix of bilateral trade flows to estimate
gravity equations.
Existing theoretical models can easily explain the role of economic size in shaping trade flows,
but none explains the role of distance. Krugman’s (1980) seminal contribution was motivated
1McCallum (1995) measures a very large negative effect of the US-Canada border. Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) show that the large difference in the size of the US and Canada explains this seemingly implausible border
effect.
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in part by the empirical regularity of the gravity equation. His model explains how in the ag-
gregate, trade flows are proportional to country size, and inversely related to trade barriers. To
the extent that distance proxies for trade barriers, his model can also explain why distance has a
negative impact on trade flows in general, but it has nothing else to say about the precise role of
distance. Several others have shown that the same type of predictions as Krugman can be derived
in various other settings. Anderson (1979) derives a similar gravity equation under the Armington
assumption that goods are differentiated by country of origin. Eaton and Kortum (2002) derive a
similar gravity equation in a modern version of trade driven by Ricardian comparative advantages.
Chaney (2008) extends the Melitz (2003) model to derive a similar gravity equation in a model
with heterogeneous firms. Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (forthcoming) show that the
same gravity equation can be derived in many settings with or without heterogeneous firms.
None of these models however can explain the precise role played by distance. The fact that
the distance elasticity of trade has remained stable around -1 over such a long time and over
such diverse countries is almost a direct rejection of these models. In all of these models, granted
that trade costs increase with distance in a log-linear way, the distance elasticity of trade is the
product of some deep parameters of the model2 with the distance elasticity of trade barriers. To
explain why the distance coefficient is close to -1, those models need some mysterious alignment
of those deep parameters. Even if that magical alignment were to happen in a particular year, for
a particular sector and a particular country, it is hard to understand how it could survive beyond
that point for more than a century. The technology of transportation, the political impediments
to trade, the nature of the goods traded, as well as the relative importance of the countries trading
these goods all have undergone some tremendous change over the course of the last century. In
other words, all the deep parameters identified by the various existing trade theories have been
evolving over time, while the empirical distance coefficient in the gravity equation has remained
essentially constant.
This paper offers the first explanation that is immune to this critique. I explain not only the
role of economic size, which is straightforward, but also the role of distance. This explanation is
based on the emergence of a stable network of importers and exporters. I assume that there are
two ways for firms to circumvent the barriers associated with international trade. The first one is
to pay a direct cost for creating a foreign contact. This cost is in essence similar to the trade cost
2The demand elasticity in the Krugman and Armington models, the dispersion of productivities across firms in
the Eaton and Kortum model, and a combination of both in the Melitz-Chaney model.
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assumed in all existing trade models. The second one is to “talk” with one’s existing contacts, and
learn about the contacts of one’s contacts. This second channel requires direct interaction. While
advances in the technology for transportation or communication will surely affect the first type of
cost, and may even affect the frequency of the second type of interaction, it does not change the
need for direct interaction. In my model, the geographic distribution of any one firm’s exports
does depend on how distance affects the direct cost of creating contacts. But in the aggregate,
the details of this distance function vanish, and the gravity equation emerges. This is the main
contribution of this paper: even if technological, political or economic changes affect the particular
shape of firm level exports, in the aggregate, the gravity equation remains essentially unaffected.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1, I present a theoretical model
of firm level and aggregate trade. In section 1.1, I spell out an economic model of trade subject
to matching frictions. In section 1.2, I characterize the patterns of firm level trade. In section 1.3,
I show that aggregate trade obeys the gravity equation. In section 2, I test empirically the main
theoretical predictions of the model. I relegate to Appendix A all mathematical proofs, and to
Appendix B the description of the data and robustness checks.
1 Theory
In this section, I develop a simple model of the formation of a stable network of importers and
exporters. The model is a extension of the Krugman (1980) model of international trade in
differentiated goods subject to matching frictions similar to the Chaney (2011) model of trade
networks.
1.1 A model of trade subject to matching frictions
This model is purposefully simple, and is meant to illustrate how the proposed dynamic model of
firm trade can be derived in a classical trade setting. The hasty reader may skip this section so as
to focus her attention on the formation of a stable network of exporters in the following section
1.2.
There are two types of goods: final goods and intermediate inputs. Final goods are produced
by combining differentiated intermediate inputs and labor. Intermediate inputs are themselves
produced by combining differentiated inputs and labor, so that the economy features roundabout
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production. Final goods are sold locally to consumers on a perfectly competitive market. Inter-
mediate inputs are produced and distributed worldwide by monopolistically competitive firms. I
will focus most of my attention on the production and trade of these intermediate goods. Due to
matching frictions, intermediate input firms source their inputs from, and sell their output to a
subset of producers only.
The static problem of the firm: Consider what happens within period t. For the moment,
I drop the time t index. Firm i buys intermediate inputs from a continuum of suppliers k ∈ Ki
and sells its output to a continuum of customers j ∈ Ji. Both Ki and Ji will be endogenously de-
termined dynamically below. Firm i combines labor with qi (k) units of differentiated intermediate
inputs from each supplier k to produce Qi units of output,
Qi =
￿ˆ
k∈Ki
qi (k)
σ−1
σ dk
￿α σσ−1
L1−αi (1)
with 0 < α < 1 the share of intermediate inputs in production and σ > 1 the elasticity of
substitution between any two intermediate inputs. Firm i faces the same iso-elastic demand from
any customer j ∈ Ji,
pj (i) qj (i) =
pj (i)
1−σ
´
k∈Kj pj (k)
1−σ dk
αXj (2)
with pj (i) the price charged by i to customer j, and Xj the total spending on intermediate inputs
and labor by j. Given these iso-elastic demands, firm i charges all its customers the same constant
mark-up, σσ−1 , over its marginal cost,
pj (i) = pi =
σ
σ − 1w
1−α
￿ˆ
k∈Ki
pi (k)
1−σ dk
￿ α
1−σ
(3)
with w the competitive wage rate. For simplicity, I will consider a symmetric equilibrium where
all firms within a cohort have the same number of suppliers and customers3 and therefore charge
the same price: ￿Kj￿ = ￿K￿ and pj (k) = p for any j, k ￿= i. Given this symmetry assumption,
the demand equation (2) and the pricing equation (3), the total sales of firm i only depend on the
number of suppliers and of customers,
piQi =
ˆ
j∈Ji
piqj (i) dj = ￿Ki￿α × ￿Ji￿ ×
￿
α
X
￿K￿1+α
￿
(4)
3In such a symmetric equilibrium, all the complexity of the input-output structure of the economy is assumed
away. See Carvalho (2010), Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Saleh (2010) or Atalay, Chaney, Hortacsu and Syverson
(2011) for models with such a complex structure.
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To save on notations, I will make from now on a slight abuse of language and use K (resp. J) to
denote the mass of suppliers (resp. customers), instead of ￿K￿ (resp. ￿J￿).
It is clear from the previous Equation (4) that the number of suppliers and customers increases
output, sales, and ultimately profits. The mass of suppliers, Ki, plays a role equivalent to capital,
or to a productivity shifter. I will use the “capital” analogy, and denote by Ii the “investment” in
acquiring new contacts. The notion that the diversity of intermediate inputs plays a role similar
to capital has been presented since at least Romer (1990).4 The mass of customers, Ji, plays a
role equivalent to a proportional demand shifter. A firm is willing to pay for information about
new upstream and downstream contacts, as well as sell the information it has about its existing
contacts. I now turn to this dynamic decision.
The dynamic problem of the firm: A firm is born with a mass K0 = J0 of suppliers
and customers. Those contacts are randomly distributed along the real line R according to the
symmetric p.d.f. g0. One can think that a potential entrant pays a fixed entry cost to create a
new firm. This fixed cost buys both the blueprint for a new variety and this initial set of upstream
and downstream contacts. This fixed cost will be reimbursed by a discounted stream of per period
profit over the lifespan of the firm. Imposing a free entry condition would pin down the number
of entrants each period.
Once born, a firm expands its set of suppliers and customers. While a priori, firm i may
buy and sell information about both suppliers and customers, I assume instead that i actively
buys information about new suppliers from its existing suppliers, actively sells information about
suppliers to its existing customers, but passively waits to be contacted by downstream firms. In
a symmetric equilibrium, this simplification is innocuous since firms have as many suppliers as
customers on average: if i is a supplier to j then j is a customer of i. The sequence of contact
formation is depicted in Figure 1.
I assume that a firm always has the option of directly searching for suppliers on its own. This
outside option technology offers new names at a given constant marginal cost. Facing the threat
of this outside option, firm i sets a constant price pI to reveal the name of one of its suppliers
to its existing customers. The price pI is set just low enough to prevent firm j ∈ Ji to look for
contact directly instead. Just as i sells information about its suppliers, it also buys at the same
price pI information about new suppliers from its existing suppliers.
4See among many examples the theoretical model of di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) or the empirical evidence
of Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011) for two recent applications of this notion in trade.
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Figure 1: Firms buy and sell information about suppliers and customers.
Notes: The straight solid arrows represent input-output linkages: e.g. firm k supplies intermediate inputs to firm i.
The curvy dotted lines represent information linkages: e.g. firm k sells to firm i information about a new supplier
k￿. After these information exchanges take place, firm i has a new supplier, k’, and a new customer, j’.
In addition to the direct cost pI of buying information, firm i faces a convex adjustment cost
G (Ii,Ki). The adjustment cost function is assumed increasing and convex in I, GI , GII > 0,
decreasing in K, GK < 0, and homogenous of degree one in I and K. This convex adjustment
cost function is analogous to the adjustment cost assumed in the classical investment literature,
as in Lucas (1967) or Hayashi (1982). As in the investment literature, I assume that the more
suppliers a firm already has (Ki), the more efficient it is at acquiring new suppliers (Ii), in such
a way that the adjustment cost G is proportional to Ki for a given investment share Ii/Ki. As
in Lucas (1967), this homogeneity assumption will warrantee that Gibrat’s law holds, in the sense
that the growth rate of a firm is independent of its size.
Note that as in classical investment models, firm i has two reason for accumulating more
suppliers, i.e. “investing” in Ki: first, a higher Ki increases its productivity and profits,;but it also
lowers the future cost of “investment” in acquiring new suppliers, Ii. However, while firm i sells
information about its suppliers to its customers, having more suppliers does not change firm i’s
future prospect for selling more information: the price firm i sets for selling information about
suppliers, pI , is set by an arbitrage condition, and the number of requests for names firm i receives
depends on the decisions of its customers, j ∈ Ji. At each point in time t, firm i receives I (t)
requests for names, where I (t) depends on the “investment” decision of downstream firms, which
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is beyond firm i’s control.
Finally, I assume that firm i’s existing contacts are lost at an exogenous rate δ.
Firm i solves the following dynamic optimization problem,
max
Ii(t)
V (0) =
ˆ +∞
0
e−ρt
￿
Ki (t)
α
￿
αJi (t)X (t)
σK (t)1+α
￿
− pI (t) Ii (t) + pII (t)−G (Ii (t) ,Ki (t))
￿
dt
(5)
s.t. K˙i = Ii − δKi
Firm i maximizes a discounted stream of profits, with an exogenous discount rate ρ. The first
term represents per period profits, net of spending and receipts on information acquisition. It
is a fraction 1/σ of the aggregate sales derived in Equation (4). In addition, firm i purchases
information about Ii new suppliers at a price pI each, and it sells information about I suppliers
at a price pI each. Finally, firm i pays to convex adjustment cost G to acquire new suppliers.
The solution to this classical problem is such that the “investment” rate is independent of the
stock of “capital” (Gibrat’s law). In other words, firm i increases its number of suppliers Ki at a
rate that is independent of Ki,
Ii = β
￿pI
w
, ρ, δ
￿
×Ki
where the function β sumarizes the contributions of the production function and the adjustment
cost function that are relevant for the optimal investment decision. In general equilibrium, I could
solve for the sequence of prices pI (t) /w (t). In this model as in any model where growth is driven
by the accumulation of one factor of production (here K) combined with labor under constant
returns to scale, growth ultimately is driven by population growth, as in Solow (1956). While I do
not explicitly solve for such a steady state growth path, I will assume that the economy is along
such a path, so that I/K = β is constant.
Because all firms are charging the same price pI per contact information, firm i has no reason
to direct its search for new suppliers to any particular k ∈ Ki. To break this indeterminacy, I
assume that the Ii new names come uniformly from all existing suppliers Ki. This means that
any one of the existing suppliers k ∈ Ki reveals one of the names of its suppliers, k￿ ∈ Kk, with a
probability βdt over a small time interval dt. To break the indeterminacy of which name k￿ ∈ Kk
gets revealed by firm k, I simply assume that k draws k￿ at random among its existing Kk contacts.
Here is a recap of the conclusions of the model: A firm is born with an initial mass K0
of suppliers, distributed geographically according to the p.d.f. g0. Subsequently, contacts are
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randomly created at a rate β and lost at a rate δ, with each new contact coming from the suppliers
of the firm’s existing suppliers. The next section characterizes explicitly the dynamic evolution of
firm level trade flows, i.e. trade between the suppliers and customers of this model.
1.2 Firm level trade flows
In this section, I spell out a dynamic model of firm level trade flows that incorporates the key results
derived from the economic model in the previous section. With the exception of the population
growth rate γ, all the parameters introduced in this section (K0, g0.β, δ) are the same as the ones
in the economic model above. I treat the arrival rate of new contacts, β, as a parameter, knowing
from the model above that it is the solution to the dynamic optimization problem of the firm.
Heuristically, the model is as follows.
New firms are continuously born. When a firm is born, it randomly contacts a geographically
biased mass of firms over the entire world. After this initial period, contacts are randomly lost
and created. Old contacts are lost to i.i.d. shocks. New contacts are created in the following way:
each period, with some probability, a firm receives names from the contact lists of its existing
contacts. In other words, a firm gradually meets the contacts of its contacts, who themselves
acquire contacts in a similar way, etc.
Formally, the model is as follows.
Space: Firms are uniformly distributed over an infinite one-dimensional continuous space
represented by R. Each coordinate along that line can be thought of as representing a city, and
countries can be thought of as an arbitrary partition of that space, where a country is then a
collection of cities, or an interval of the real line.
Time: Time is continuous. In every location, new firms are born continuously, with the
population of firms in each location growing at a constant rate γ, where γ stands for “growth”. At
time t, there is the same density of firms eγt in every location, where I normalize the population
at t = 0 to 1. As the model is perfectly symmetric, I will focus my attention on a firm located at
the origin.
Birth of a firm: When a firm is born, it samples a mass K0 of contacts, distributed geo-
graphically according to the p.d.f. g0 (·). So the mass of contacts it acquires in the interval [a, b] is
K0
´ b
a g0 (x) dx. I assume that g0 is symmetric and has a finite variance, but can take any arbitrary
9
shape otherwise. For simplicity, I assume that when a firm is born, it samples contacts only among
other newly born firms: firms within each cohort gradually get connected to each other.5
Death of a firm: I assume that firms are infinitely lived. This assumption is inocuous, and
all results would carry through if firms are hit by random Poisson death shocks. A positive death
rate for firms would simply be added to the death rate of contacts below.
Birth of contacts: New contacts are continuously created as follows. At any point in time,
each existing contact may reveal one of its own contacts according to a Poisson process with arrival
rate β, where β stands for “birth”.
Death of contacts: Existing contacts are continuously lost according to a Poisson process
with arrival rate δ, where δ stands for “death”.
I assume γ > β − δ > 0. While the second assumption β − δ > 0 is not required to derive my
results, it would generate counter-factual predictions, such as an infinitly long tail of infinitesimally
small firms and firm sizes shrinking on average.
I will now define two concepts: the function ft describes the geographic distribution of the
contacts of a firm of age t, and the variable Kt describes the total mass of contacts of this firm,
ft : R→ R+ and Kt ≡
ˆ
R
ft (x) dx (6)
ft (x) is the density of contacts of a firm of age t in location x. In other words, the mass of contacts
a firm of age t in the interval [a, b] is
´ b
a ft (x) dx. The total mass of contacts a firm of age t has
worldwide is then Kt. Note that as ft does not sum up to 1, it is not a probability density. The
normalized ft/Kt on the other hand is a well defined p.d.f.
The distribution of contacts evolves recursively according to the following Partial Differential
Equation,
∂ft (x)
∂t
= β
ˆ
R
ft (x− y)
Kt
× ft (y) dy − δft (x) (7)
with the initial condition f0 (x) = K0g0 (x).
I multiply both sides of the equation by dx for a rigorous interpretation. The first term
with the integral sign on the right hand side of Equation (7) corresponds to the creation of new
contacts. It can be decomposed into four components, β, ft(x−y)Kt dx, ft (y) dy and the integral
5While this simplifying assumption is strong, relaxing it would force me to keep track of the entire system of
firms simultaneously, and would render the model analytically intractable. Numerical simulations suggest that the
main results of the paper are robust to relaxing this assumption.
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sign
´
y∈R. The first component, β, correspond to the Poisson arrival of new information from a
firm’s contacts. With a probability βdt over a small time interval dt, any one of a firm’s contact
in location y will reveal the name of one of her own contacts. The second component, ft(x−y)Kt dx,
corresponds to the probability that a contact in location y reveals the name of one of her contacts
in a neighborhood dx of x.6 Note here that I impose the simplifying assumption that a firm of
age t only meets other firms in the same cohort, who themselves have the same distribution ft.
The third component, ft (y) dy, corresponds to the fact that a firm of age t has potentially several
contacts in a neighborhood dy of y (exactly ft (y) dy of them), each of whom can potentially release
the name of one of its contacts in x. The fourth component,
´
y∈R, corresponds to the fact that the
information about new contacts in x can potentially be intermediated via contacts in any location
y ∈ R. The second term with the minus sign on the right hand side of Equation (7) corresponds
to the destruction of old contacts. Any one of the existing ft (x) dx contacts of a firm of age t in a
neighborhood dx of x may be destroyed with the same probability δdt over a small time interval
dt.
The Partial Differential Equation (7) admits an explicit analytical solution, which I relegate to
Appendix A in the interest of conciseness. While the mathematically less inclined reader may skip
the derivation of this solution, it contains a number of analytical tools that may prove useful in
a variety of economic settings. The analytical solution to the geographic distribution of contacts
ft allows me to derive closed-form solutions for the number of contacts of an individual firm, its
distribution within the population, and the geographic location of these contacts. Formal proofs
of all results are provided in Appendix A.
First, the model predicts that as a firm ages, the number (mass) of its contacts increases,
Kt = K0e
(β−δ)t (8)
The total number of a firm’s contacts grows at a constant rate equal to the net birth rate of
contacts (birth rate β minus death date δ).
Second, as both the number of a firm’s contacts and the number of firms grow exponentially,
the model predicts that the distribution of the number (mass) of contacts within the population
6Since the distribution ft sums up to Kt, the normalized ftKt is a well defined p.d.f. that sums up to one.
Moreover, the distribution of contacts for a firm located in y is the same as for a firm located in the origin (y = 0),
where all coordinates are simply shifted by the constant −y: f0,t (x) = fy,t (x− y).
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is Pareto distributed. The fraction F (K) of firms with K or fewer contacts is given by,
F (K) = 1−
￿
K
K0
￿− γβ−δ
for K ≥ K0 (9)
From Equation (8), young firms have fewer contacts than old ones. The larger is the growth rate
of the population as a whole, γ, the more young firms relative to old ones, the fewer firms with a
large number of contacts, and the thinner the upper tail of the Pareto distribution of the number
of contacts. From Equation (8) also, the higher is the growth rate of a firm’s contacts, the larger
the mass of contacts of old firms relative to young ones. The larger is the net birth rate of new
contacts, β − δ, the more firms with many contacts, and the fatter the upper tail of the Pareto
distribution of the number of contacts.
If, as is approximately verified in the data, the cross-sectional distribution of the sizes of
exporters is close to a Zipf’s law, then we should expect the Pareto shape parameter to be close
to 1, γβ−δ ≈ 1+.7 Beyond this empirical evidence, the assumption that γβ−δ ≈ 1+ seems to be
a good candidate for a stationary system, where the number of contacts of existing firms grows
approximately at the same rate as the population as a whole. While deviations from this stationary
benchmark are to be expected in the data, these deviations ought not to be large.
Third, the model predicts that as a firm ages, not only does it acquire more contacts, but
those contacts become increasingly dispersed over space. Let me denote by fK the geographic
distribution of contacts of a firm with K contacts.8 The average (squared) distance from the
contact of a firm with K contacts, ∆ (K), increases with its number of contacts,
∆ (K) ≡
ˆ
R
x2
fK (x)
K
dx = ∆0
￿
K
K0
￿ β
β−δ
(10)
where ∆0 ≡
´
R x
2g0 (x) dx is the average (squared) distance from a firm’s initial contacts. While
a firm’s initial contacts are some distance away, each wave of new contacts come from firms who
are themselves further away. As a consequence, each wave of new contacts is geographically more
dispersed than the previous one. This effect is compounded by the fact that a firm’s contacts are
also acquiring more and more remote contacts. Since a firm acquires more contacts as it ages, the
more contacts a firm has, the more dispersed these contacts are.
7Note that this simple model with a constant growth rate of the population and of the number of contacts
corresponds to the Steindl (1965) model of firm growth. More elaborate stochastic models such as Gabaix (1999)
or Luttmer (2007) deliver an invariant size distribution that is close to Zipf’s law in a more general set-up. I choose
to use the simpler Steindl model while adding substantial complexity on the geographic dimension of the model. I
conjecture that including the stochastic elements of Gabaix (1999) or Luttmer (2007) would not change my results.
8fK = ft(K) with t (K) s.t. Kt(K) = K.
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Note that the particular moment ∆ (K) only depends on two parameters of the distribution
g0: ∆0 and K0. For any two distributions g0 and g￿0 that share the same ∆0 and K0, the average
(squared) distance from a firm’s contact will evolve in the exact same way as a firm acquires
more contacts, no matter how different g0 and g￿0 are otherwise. This result arises for the same
reason that the n-th derivative of the composition of several functions only depends on their first
n derivatives: ∆ (K) is the second moment of the p.d.f. gK = fK/K, which is given by the second
derivative of the moment generating function of gK ; this second derivative does not depend on
any derivative of the moment generating function of g0 above the second one.
Note the following interesting special case, and asymptotic result: if the initial distribution of
contacts g0 is a Laplace distribution (a symmetric two-sided exponential distribution), then each
subsequent distribution gt = ft/Kt is also Laplace, with the variance increasing at a constant rate
β. Moreover, for any initial distribution g0, the distribution gt converges to a Laplace distribution
as t grows large.
Having characterized the distribution of contacts for all firms, I analyize next the aggregate
distribution of contacts, and the structure of aggregate trade flows in this economy.
1.3 Aggregate trade flows
Each firm trades one unit with each of its contacts. I have shown in the previous section that
older firms have more numerous and dispersed contacts. Knowing the distribution of contacts of
each firm, I can characterize the patterns of aggregate trade flows between firms in any set of
locations. The following lemma and proposition show that aggregate trade flows in this model
obey the gravity equation in international trade.
Lemma 1 For any distribution g0 of initial contacts that is symmetric and admits a finite vari-
ance, aggregate trade flows between two countries A and B are approximately proportional to their
respective sizes (GDPA and GDPB), and inversely related to the distance between them (DistA,B),
TA,B ∝ GDPA ×GDPB
(DistA,B)
1+￿
with ￿ ≡ 2min
￿
γ−(β−δ)
β , 1
￿
, γ the population growth rate and β (resp. δ) the birth (resp. death)
rate of contacts.
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Proposition 1 If the distribution of export sizes among individual firms is close to Zipf ’s law,
then aggregate trade flows between two countries are approximately proportional to their respective
sizes and inversely proportional to the distance between them. The canonical gravity equation holds,
TA,B ∝ GDPA ×GDPBDistA,B
The role of economic size in this model is relatively straightforward, and in essence similar to
the role of size in existing trade models. If an exporting country doubles in size, it has twice as
many firms (each with its own foreign contacts) and aggregate exports double. Symmetrically, if
an importing country doubles in size, its aggregate imports double. Note also that as in traditional
trade models, this argument is exact only for the case of a small economy, i.e. one that has a
negligible size relative to the rest of the world. If a country becomes a non-negligible fraction
of the world, part of world trade will now take place within its borders, so that the elasticity of
aggregate trade with respect to size eventually decreases below one for large countries.
The role of distance on the other hand is novel compared to existing trade models.
While the exact intuition behind the precise functional forms in Lemma 1 is mathematically
arduous, a simplified explanation would be as follows. Each cohort has a different distribution
of contacts. From Equation (9), the distribution of the number of contacts in the population
is a power law. From Equation (10), the variance of the distributions of contacts of each firm
(the average squared distance from the firm’s contacts) is a power function of the number of
contacts of this firm. So the variances of the various distributions of contacts are themselves
power law distributed. It turns out that the aggregation of a family of distributions with power
law distributed variances is approximately a power law. This result is powerful and holds no
matter what the exact shape of each distribution is. In particular, I do not need to impose any
restriction on how distance affects the formation of contacts.9
To understand why the aggregation of a family of distributions with power distributed vari-
ances is approximately a power law itself, consider the following simplified set up: assume that
each of these distributions can be approximated by a uniform distribution. A firm with K
contacts with a variance ∆ (K) has therefore a constant density K/4
￿
∆ (K) over the interval
9While I assume that distance affects the creation of initial contacts, I only impose that new contacts are
symmetric (they are equally likely to be formed “eastward” or “westward”), and they occur on average at a finite
(squared) distance. Beyond these two minimal regularity conditions, the relationship can take any arbitrary shape.
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￿
−2￿∆ (K),+2￿∆ (K)￿. Only those firms that have contacts distributed with a standard devi-
ation higher than x/2 will export at a distance x. The aggregate amount exported at a distance
x is then the sum (integral) of the number (density) of contacts of each of those firms. Since the
K’s are power law distributed, and the
￿
∆ (K) are a power function of K, the amount exported
is a power function of x (the integral of a power function is a power function). Formally, using
Equation (9) for the distribution of K’s and Equation (10) for ∆ (K), the fraction (density) of
firms that export at a distance x, which I denote ϕ (x), is given by the following expression,
ϕ
￿
x = 2
￿
∆ (K)
￿
∝
ˆ +∞
K
k
4
￿
∆ (k)
dF (k) ∝ 1
x1+2
γ−(β−δ)
β
The intuition for why a higher γ, lower β or higher δ increase the exponent on distance in
the gravity equation is more straightforward. The contacts of younger firms are geographically
less dispersed than those of older firms. The faster the population growth rate, i.e. the higher
γ, the more younger firms there are relative to older ones: aggregate trade declines faster with
distance. The less frequently firms acquire new contacts, i.e. the lower β, the fewer chances firms
have to expand their network of contacts towards longer distances: firm level and aggregate trade
declines faster with distance. δ plays the opposite role to β: the higher δ, the faster aggregate
trade declines with distance.
Proposition 1 shows that the -1 distance elasticity of aggregate trade is related to Zipf’s law for
the distribution of the size of firm level exports. Formally, it is the same assumption that generates
Zipf’s law for the distribution of firm level exports
￿
γ
β−δ ≈ 1+
￿
that also makes aggregate trade
approximately inversely proportional to distance
￿
1 + 2γ−(β−δ)β ≈ 1+
￿
. In this model, firms that
export a lot, i.e. firms with many contacts, are also firms that export far away. The same
parameter condition that gives the highest share of total exports to large firms, Zipf’s law, also
gives the highest share in aggregate exports to firms that export far away. With exports a power
function of distance, this corresponds to the gravity equation with a -1 distance elasticity of trade.
This result however is not tautological. Zipf’s law describes the distribution of total exports
of individual firms within the population. It says nothing about where those exports go. While
Zipf’s law is a statement about how much different firms export, the gravity equation is a statement
about where firms export.10
10The mathematical properties that generate Zipf’s law and the gravity equation are also different. Zipf’s law is
derived as the solution to a differential equation, while the gravity equation is derived from the regularly-varying
property of a sequence of functions. The only direct connection between both results is that the same stationarity
condition is required to get a -1 coefficient for the power law distribution of firm exports and for the distance
elasticity of trade.
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On a more conceptual level, this model departs from existing traditional models in its treat-
ment of distance and trade barriers. In existing models, distance captures or proxies physical trade
barriers. In this model, distance captures informational barriers and the network that transmits
information. As in the Krugman (1980) model, the premise of this model is that if left unhindered,
all firms would export to all countries. In the Krugman (1980) model, trade barriers are the only
impediment to trade; they can be circumvented to the extent that firms can cover those trade
costs. In this model on the other hand, while informational barriers can also be circumvented
by paying some direct cost (the g0 function is a very general reduced form for the direct cost of
information acquisition), more importantly, they can be circumvented by the direct interaction
between people. This feature implies that information about potential foreign contacts is trans-
mitted along individual connections. Advances in transportation or communication technologies
affect physical trade barriers as well as the direct cost of information (the function g0), but not
the need for direct interactions. A model that only features direct costs will fail to explain why
distance plays the same role today as it did a century ago. In this model on the other hand,
the shape of aggregate trade flows is immune to changes in the g0 function. If direct interactions
between people play a role today as it did a century ago, this model predicts that the role for
distance will remain unchanged.
2 Empirics
THIS SECTION IS CURRENTLY VERY PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE...
The theoretical model above predicts that if the distribution of firm level total exports is close
to Zipf’s law, and if the average (squared) distance of a firm’s exports is a power function of this
firm’s number of contacts, then aggregate exports follow the gravity equation.
To confirm this prediction, using firm level data on export for France in 1992, I show in Figure
2 the relation between the log of the rank of a firm, versus the log of its size. The relationship is
very close to Zipf’s law for large exporters. In Figure 3, I show the relation between the log of the
average (squared) distance from a firm’s exports, ∆ (K) versus the log of the number of foreign
countries it exports to. The relationship between ∆ (K) and K is well approximated by a power
function. The estimated slopes of these two relationships would predict according to my model
that the number of firms that export to country c at a distance Distc should be proportional to
1/Dist1.17c . In the data, it is proportional to 1/Dist1.16c .
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Figure 2: The distribution of firm level total exports is Zipf.
Notes: This graph shows on a log-log scale the fraction (in percentiles of the population) of firms that export more
than x as a function of the value x of a firm’s total exports (in million French Francs). This distribution is well
approximated by Zipf’s law for the largest firms, as shown by the straight fitted line in this log-log scale. The
estimated slope is -1.0386 (s.e. 0.00185, adj-R2=99.24%). Data: all French exporters, 1992.
Conclusion
This paper offers the first theoretical explanation for the gravity equation in international trade
in the sense that it explains not only why trade is proportional to size, but also the mysterious
-1 distance elasticity of trade. This explanation is immune to the critique that the impact of
distance on trade ought to change with changes in the technology for trading goods, in the types
of goods traded, in the political barriers to trade, in the set of countries involved in trade, etc.
As long as the individuals that make up firms engage in direct communication with their clients
and suppliers, and as long as information permeates through these direct interactions, one ought
to expect that aggregate trade is close to proportional to country size and inversely proportional
to distance.
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Figure 3: Average (squared) distance of exports versus number of export destinations.
Notes: This graph shows on a log-log scale the average (squared) distance of exports, ∆ (K), among firms that
export to K foreign countries, as a function of K. The relationship is close to a straight line in this log-log scale,
suggesting that ∆ (K) is well approximated by a power function of K. Distances are measured in thousand km’s.
Data: all French exporters, 1992.
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APPENDIX
A Mathematical proofs
Proposition 2 The geographic distribution of the contacts of a firm of age t is given by,
ft (x) = B−1
￿
K0e(β−δ)tB [g0 (x)]
(1− eβt)B [g0 (x)] + eβt
￿
where B is the two-sided bilateral Laplace transform,11 B−1 its inverse, K0 is the mass of initial
contacts of a newly born firm, g0 is the p.d.f. of these initial contacts, β (resp. δ) is the Poisson
birth (resp. death) rate of new (resp. old) contacts.
Proof. Recognizing a convolution product12 in Equation (7), I can rewrite it in a compact
form,
∂ft
∂t
= β
ft ∗ ft
Kt
− δft (11)
with initial condition f0 = K0g0. I will first solve for Kt, and then solve for ft. Integrating
Equation (11) over R, and using the fact that the integral of the convolution of two functions is
the product of their integrals, I derive an ordinary differential equation for Kt,
∂Kt
∂t
= β
Kt ×Kt
Kt
− δKt = (β − δ)Kt
with initial condition K0. This ODE admits the simple solution,
Kt = K0e
(β−δ)t
Plugging this result into Equation (11), taking the two-sided Laplace transform of this equation (I
denote by fˆ the transform of f), and using the convolution theorem which states that the Laplace
transform of the convolution of two function is the product of their Laplace transforms, I get the
following ordinary differential equation,
∂fˆt
∂t
= β
fˆ2t
K0e(β−δ)t
− δfˆt
11The two-sided Laplace transform is closely related to the moment-generating function. For a random variable
X with a p.d.f. f , the moment generating function µX is defined as µX (s) = E
￿
esX
￿
, while the Laplace transform
B [f ] is defined as B [f ] (s) = E ￿e−sX￿ = ´R e−sxf (x) dx, so that µX (−s) = B [f ] (s). This definition extends to
positive functions which are not probability densities.
12Remember that the p.d.f. of the sum of two random variables is the convolution of their p.d.f.’s.
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with initial condition fˆ0 = K0gˆ0. This ODE admits the solution,
fˆt =
K0e(β−δ)tgˆ0
(1− eβt) gˆ0 + eβt
Taking the inverse Laplace transform, I recover the proposed solution for ft.
Corollary Equations (8), (9) and (10) are satisfied,
Kt = K0e
(β−δ)t
F (K) = 1−
￿
K
K0
￿− γβ−δ
for K ≥ K0
∆ (K) = ∆0
￿
K
K0
￿ β
β−δ
for K ≥ K0
Proof. Equation (8). Using the property of the Laplace transform, the total mass of contacts
of a firm of age t, Kt, is the Laplace transform fˆt (s) evaluated at zero,
Kt = fˆt (0) = K0e
(β−δ)t
where I used the fact that since g0 is a well defined p.d.f. that sums up to 1, gˆ0 (0) = 1.
Equation (9). The formula for Kt provides the following relation between a firm’s number
of contacts and its age,
et =
￿
Kt
K0
￿ 1
β−δ
The population grows at an exponential rate γ so that the fraction of firms younger than t is￿
1− e−γt￿. Since a firm of age t has a total number of contacts Kt, using the above expression
for et, I get the proposed formula for the fraction of firms with fewer than K contacts,
F (K) = 1−
￿
K
K0
￿− γβ−δ
Equation (10). The average (squared) distance between a firm of age t and its contacts,
∆t, is the variance of the p.d.f. ft/Kt of the distribution of this firm’s contacts. Again using
the property of the Laplace transform, this variance is simply the second derivative of￿ft/Kt (s)
evaluated at zero. Simple algebra gives this second derivative,
￿ft/Kt” (s) =
eβt
￿
gˆ0” (s)
￿￿
eβt − 1￿ gˆ0 − eβt￿− 2gˆ￿0 (s)2 ￿eβt − 1￿￿
((eβt − 1) gˆ0 (s)− eβt)3
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Since g0 is a well defined symmetric p.d.f. with finite variance, I can use the following properties
of its Laplace transform: gˆ0 (0) = 1 (a p.d.f. sums up to 1), gˆ￿0 (0) = 0 (g0 is symmetric) and
gˆ0” (0) = ∆0 (g0 has a finite variance ∆0). The previous expression evaluated at zero simplifies
into the proposed formula,
∆t =￿ft/Kt” (0) = ∆0eβt
Plugging the expression et = (Kt/K0)
1
β−δ into the above formula for ∆t, I derive the proposed
relationship between a firm’s total number of contacts K and the average (squared) distance from
its contacts, ∆ (K),
∆ (K) = ∆0
￿
K
K0
￿ β
β−δ
Proposition 3 If the initial distribution of contacts is Laplace, g0 ∼ Laplace
￿
0,
￿
∆0/2
￿
, then
the distribution of contacts remains Laplace at all subsequent period, gt = ft/Mt ∼ Laplace
￿
0, eβt/2
￿
∆0/2
￿
.
Moreover, for any initial distribution g0, asymptotically as t → ∞, the p.d.f. of contacts,
gt = ft/Kt, converges to a Laplace
￿
0, eβt/2
￿
distribution,gˆt (s) ∝t→∞
1
1+(eβt/2s)2
gt (x) ∝
t→∞
1
2eβt/2
exp
￿− |x| /eβt/2￿
Proof. For simplicity, consider a normalized Laplace distribution g0 ∼ Laplace (0, 1). The
proof can trivially be extended to
￿
∆0/2 ￿= 1. The Laplace transform of g0 is gˆ0 (s) = 11+s2 .
From Proposition 2, the Laplace transform of g is then,
gˆt (s) =
fˆt (s)
Kt
=
gˆ0 (s)
(1− eβt) gˆ0 (s) + eβt =
1
1 +
￿
eβt/2s
￿2
where one recognizes the Laplace transform of a Laplace
￿
0, eβt/2
￿
distribution.
From Equation (11), I derive an ordinary differential equation for gˆt,
∂
∂t
gˆt = β
￿
gˆ2t − gˆt
￿
Now postulate that gˆt is of the form gˆt (s) = h
￿
eβt/2s, t
￿
. Then from the previous equation I
derive a partial differential equation for h (y, t),
∂
∂t
h = β
￿
h2 − h+ 1
2
y
∂
∂y
h
￿
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Accepting without proof that limt→∞ ∂∂th = 0, hmust asymptotically satisfy the following ordinary
differential equation,
1
2
y
∂
∂y
h = h− h2
which admits the solution,
h (y) =
1
1 + y2
This completes the proof.
Lemma 1 (reminded) For any distribution g0 of initial contacts that is symmetric and admits a
finite variance, aggregate trade flows between two countries A and B are approximately proportional
to their respective sizes (GDPA and GDPB), and inversely related to the distance between them
(DistA,B),
TA,B ∝ GDPA ×GDPB
(DistA,B)
1+￿
with ￿ ≡ 2min
￿
γ−(β−δ)
β , 1
￿
, γ the population growth rate and β (resp. δ) the birth (resp. death)
rate of contacts.
Proof. I will prove first that aggregate trade is proportional to economic size, and second that
it is inversely proportional to distance raised to the power (1 + ￿).
Size: In any location x, all firms of the same age t have the same volume of exports towards
and the same volume of import from any other location. For any λ > 0, if a location, or any set
of locations (any country) produces λ times as much in the aggregate, it will export and import
λ times as much in the aggregate. Aggregate trade flows between any arbitrary set of locations
(countries) are therefore proportional to the size of the importing and exporting countries.
Distance: Denote by ϕ (x) the p.d.f. of aggregate exports from the origin towards any location
x ∈ R. It is the weighted average of the exports of firms in the origin of all ages towards location
x, normalized to sum up to 1,
ϕ (x) ≡ γ − β + δ
M0
ˆ ∞
0
e−γtft (x) dt
I will prove that ϕ (x) is equal to 1/x1+￿ for x→ +∞, up to a slowly varying function L,13
ϕ (x) = L (x)× 1
x1+￿
13A function L is said to be slowly varying around +∞ i.i.f.
lim
x→+∞
L (λx)
L (x)
= 1, ∀λ > 0
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Step 1: By virtue of Karamata’s abelian and tauberian theorem, the p.d.f. ϕ (x) is equal to
1/x1+￿ for x → +∞, up to a slowly varying function i.i.f. its Laplace transform ϕˆ is such that
1− ϕˆ (s) is equal to s￿ for s→ 0, up to a slowly varying function. See for instance de Haan (1976)
for an application of Karamata’s theorem to p.d.f.’s. Formally, this means that I need to prove,
lim
s↓0
1− ϕˆ (λs)
1− ϕˆ (s) = λ
￿, ∀λ > 0
Step 2: Taking the two-sided Laplace transform of ϕ which I denote by ϕˆ, and using the
properties of the Laplace transform, the formula for ft in Proposition 2 and simple algebra, I get,
ϕˆ =
γ − β + δ
K0
ˆ ∞
0
e−γtfˆtdt
=
γ − β + δ
K0
ˆ ∞
0
e−γt
K0e(β−δ)tgˆ0
(1− eβt) gˆ0 + eβt dt
= (γ − β + δ)
ˆ ∞
0
e−(γ−π+δ)t
gˆ0
eβt (1− gˆ0) + gˆ0dt
= −γ − β + δ
β
∞￿
n=1
￿
gˆ0
gˆ0−1
￿n
n+ (γ − β + δ) /β
where I iteratively integrate by part to get the last expression.
Step 3: To save on notations, I introduce α = γ−(β−δ)β so that ￿ = 2min [α, 1]. Manipulating
the previous expression ϕˆ, recognizing Gauss’ hypergeometric function 2F1, and invoking one
among the hundreds of useful properties of the hypergeometric function,14 I get,
1− ϕˆ (s) = 1 + α
∞￿
n=1
￿
gˆ0(s)
gˆ0(s)−1
￿n
n+ α
=
∞￿
n=0
(1)n (α)n
(1 + α)n n!
￿
gˆ0 (s)
gˆ0 (s)− 1
￿n
= 2F1
￿
1,α, 1 + α,
gˆ0 (s)
gˆ0 (s)− 1
￿
=
Γ(α− 1)Γ(1 + α)
Γ(α)Γ(α)
￿
− gˆ0 (s)
gˆ0 (s)− 1
￿−1 ∞￿
k=0
(1)k(1− α)k
k!(2− α)k
￿
gˆ0 (s)
gˆ0 (s)− 1
￿−k
+
Γ(1− α)Γ(1 + α)
Γ(1)Γ(1)
￿
− gˆ0 (s)
gˆ0 (s)− 1
￿−α ∞￿
k=0
(α)k(0)k
k!(α)k
￿
gˆ0 (s)
gˆ0 (s)− 1
￿−k
for a sufficiently small s such that
￿￿￿￿ gˆ0 (s)gˆ0 (s)− 1
￿￿￿￿ > 1 and a non-integer α
=
α
α− 1
￿
− gˆ0 (s)
gˆ0 (s)− 1
￿−1
2F1
￿
1, 1− α, 2− α,
￿
gˆ0 (s)
gˆ0 (s)− 1
￿−1￿
+ Γ(1− α)Γ(1 + α)
￿
− gˆ0 (s)
gˆ0 (s)− 1
￿−α
14See http://functions.wolfram.com/HypergeometricFunctions/Hypergeometric2F1/02/02/ or a modified
version of Kummer’s Theorem (1836), as presented by Slater (1966) in Equation 1.7.1.3 on page 31.
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Step 4: The following lemma will prove useful. If g is the p.d.f. of a random variable X
symmetric around the origin and with a finite variance 0 < V ar (X) < +∞, then its Laplace
transform gˆ is such that for any λ > 0,
lim
s↓0
1−gˆ(λs)
gˆ(λs)
1−gˆ(s)
gˆ(s)
= λ2
To prove this lemma, note that g being a well defined p.d.f., gˆ (0) = 1. Using l’Hôpital’s rule,
lim
s↓0
1−gˆ(λs)
gˆ(λs)
1−gˆ(s)
gˆ(s)
= lim
s↓0
1− gˆ (λs)
1− gˆ (s)
gˆ (s)
gˆ (λs)
= λ lim
s↓0
∂
∂s gˆ (λs)
∂
∂s gˆ (s)
I use the known result that gˆ(k) (0) = (−1)k µk where µk isX’s k-th moment. SinceX is symmetric,
its first moment is zero, and gˆ￿ (0) = µ1 = 0. The limit is again indeterminate. Applying l’Hôpital’s
rule a second time, and by the assumption 0 < V ar (X) = µ2 − µ21 = µ2 < +∞, I prove the
proposed lemma,
λ lim
s↓0
∂
∂s gˆ (λs)
∂
∂s gˆ (s)
= λ2 lim
s↓0
∂2
∂s2 gˆ (λs)
∂2
∂s2 gˆ (s)
= λ2
µ2
µ2
= λ2
Note that the assumption of finite variance is a sufficient but not a necessary condition. For
example, Student’s t-distribution with 2 degrees of freedom satisfies the desired property although
its variance is infinite.
Step 5: Let h(s) =
￿
− gˆ0(s)gˆ0(s)−1
￿−1
= gˆ0(s)gˆ0(s)−1 and note that h(0) = 0 and 1− ϕˆ (0) = 0. Using
l’Hôpital’s rule and the above lemma for the penultimate equality, I can now characterize the limit
of interest,
lim
s↓0
1− ϕˆ(λs)
1− ϕˆ (s) = lims↓0
∂
∂s ϕˆ(λs)
∂
∂s ϕˆ(s)
= lim
s↓0
∂
∂sh(λs)
￿
α
α−1 2F1(1, 1− α, 2− α,−h(λs)) + α2−αh(λs)2F1(2, 2− α, 3− α,−h(λs)) + Γ(1− α)Γ(1 + α)α(h(λs))α−1
￿
∂
∂sh(s)
￿
α
α−1 2F1(1, 1− α, 2− α,−h(s)) + α2−αh(s)2F1(2, 2− α, 3− α,−h(s)) + Γ(1− α)Γ(1 + α)α(h(s))α−1
￿
=
￿
λ2 when α > 1 so that the second and third terms vanish
λ2α when α < 1 so that the first and second terms vanish
= λ￿
This completes the proof.
Proposition 1 (reminded) If the distribution of export sizes among individual firms is close
to Zipf ’s law, then aggregate trade flows between two countries are approximately proportional to
their respective sizes and inversely proportional to the distance between them. The canonical gravity
27
equation holds,
TA,B ∝ GDPA ×GDPBDistA,B
Proof. From Equation (9), the distribution of export volumes among individual firms is close
to Zipf’s law if γβ−δ ≈ 1+. Plugging this condition into Lemma 1, one gets ￿ ≈ 0+, so that the
canonical gravity equation holds for aggregate trade flows.
B Data
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